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THE CONTINUITY OF CASE LAW.
In the last days of February, 19o9, the Supreme Court
of the United States was delivering an opinion in the case
of the "Folmina," new steel steamship of the latest type,
whose cargo of tea had been damaged by salt water. The
august Court was sitting in that city which one hundred
years ago had been but little more than a wilderness, half
morass, half scrubby woodland, with the crude buildings
of the new nation rising here and there, separated from
each other by long stretches of the desolate waste. Servants
of a new nation, members of a court which counted not
much more than a hundred years of active life, they sat
there representing the-latest phase of the judicial development of the world, to expound the law as they found it
to be in the latest year of the republic.
The case which they were considering was not- in any
way remarkable; it was in fact a very- ordinary, case with
no especial elements of interest. A very practical case,
however, a matter of damages and dollars-words potent
for the exorcism of the unpractical and the ideal-a case,
therefore, quite to our purpose. But even in the year 19o9,
in the city of Washington, it is the habit of the court in
formulating its opinion, to rest its reasoning upon the principles propounded in previously decided cases. Mr. Justice
.(399)
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White delivered the opinion in the case, deciding in regard
to the chief point that, -When goods are received in good
order on board of a vessel, under a bill of lading agreeing
to deliver them, at the termination of the voyage, in like
good order and condition, and the goods are damaged on
the voyage * * * the burden lies upon the carrier to
show that it was occasioned by one of the perils for which
he was not responsible." A modern enough matter, any
day night-most days do--bring such cases up to the bar
of some one of our numerous courts for decision. We
have here, in fact, an everyday case, on an everyday busiiness matter, not calling for the enunciation of any new
theory, for any unusual analytical examination, or for any
exceptional depth of reasoning; a case treated as hundreds
of such cases have been treated before.
As has been said, the decision followed the reasoning
of previously decided cases. Among the cases followed was
that of the Niagara, 21 How. (U. S.) 347 (1858).
This case in turn relied on Rich v. Lamnbert, 12 How.
(U. S.) 347, (185) which leads us for authority to the
case of Forward v. Pittard, I. T. R. 27 (I785). Through
the medium of this very well known case we reach, in
the arguments of counsel and in the decision itself, citations to a great number of the old law reports, and it
also takes us to the famous case of Coggs v. Bernard, 2
Ld. Raymond, 909 (1704), in which Lord Holt set forth

with all the learning at his command, not only the precepts of the Common Law, but those of the Civil Law
as well. Lord Holt, in his opinion, after giving to
the consideration of the case much of his wisdom
and learning, said: "I have said thus much in this
case, because it is of great consequence, that the raw should
be settled in this point, but I don't know whether I may
have settled it, or may not, rather, have unsettled it. But

however that happen, I have stirred these points, which
wiser heads in time may settle." No wiser head seems as
yet to have stirred the point to any successful issue with
his decision, and the case of the "Folmena," steel steam-
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ship of the modern type, was decided in agreement with the
cases from the Year Books upon which Lord Holt founded
his opinion in Coggs v. Bernard. Thus, in this case which
we have just followed from 212 U. S. to the seventh year
of Henry the Sixth, we find ourselves consulting the pages
of the Year Books to find a foundation stone of one branch
of the law upon which its legal structure rests today.
Take away that foundation stone, and we have the case
poised in mid-air, resting upon opinions which in turn rest
upon nothing. Not that there is any magic virtue in the
name of "Year Book;" not that all legal principles had
their beginning in those volumes; not that there is no new
law; that there are no modern theories of a vigorous and
healthful type; nothing so foolish. But the virtue of the
Common Law lies in its oneness with the common life. Beyond all other systems of law it has the virtue of being bone
of the people's bone, flesh of their flesh. As the civilization
of -today has grown out of the civilization of those centuries
in which the cases reported in the Year Books were decided,
so the law of today has grown out of the law of that day.
There has been no break in the steady line from one to the
other. In those centuries covered by the decisions of the
Year Books, the English were building up a people; a people
which should become a dominant people; who should greatly
change the face of the earth. Gradually they were producing yet another race, who would not be content with the
limitations, physical or mental, of the British Isles, and out
of whose dissatisfaction with those limitations should come
new peoples, who would inaugurate a new civilization, and
administer under new conditions that old law in which
they had been trained, and which they were to 4evelop.
But, as there was no break in the continuity of the civilization, so there was no break in the continuity of the law. To&
day the voices of those old judges speak to us from the
most modern of tribunals, and the principles which they
then enunciated are the principles upon which we base the
reasoning of our courts. They are immutable principles
in many cases certainly, always new. yet always old; but
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somewhere there must originate a certain accepted state-

ment of such opinions; somewhere there must be shaped
the first formula which is to guide the future action; and
in our law these statements were first made, and these
formulas first set forth in those books which we call the
Year Books.
We have traced a case back from the new to the old;
let us reverse the process, taking a case from the Year
Book of 19 Hen. VI. 49, pl. 5 (441). It is a case often
quoted, and for many points, but it is not in any way a
unique case. It is nearly five hundred years in point of
time from our American case, and fairly illustrative of the
old law.
.
In the nineteenth year of the reign of Henry the Sixth,
of England, over fifty years before the discovery of America, the Court was sitting at Westminster. It was an interesting court. There was Paston, of the family made so
well known to us by the letters, who had been made a
judge in early life, and who was nearing the end of a
judicial career which, although apparently not without fault,
yet had brought to him the name of the "good judge."
Sir Richard Newton was the Chief Justice, a Welshman
by birth, a man whose predilections toward privilege weakened the weight of his judgments. But, no questions as
to the rights of the Crown arising, and all the debate being
as to the rights of persons of low degree, he may be pictured
as bored, perhaps, but willing to lend a condescending ear
to the plea of either plaintiff or defendant as the case might
be. Counsel were of an even more interesting character.
There was Fortescue, only a serjeant at law now, 'but in
the next year to be raised at once, without preliminary
steps' to the Chief Justiceship of the King's Bench. NVe
may well listen to our serjeant with attention. He will
not only be a Chief Justice very soon, but he will write
that great book of his, and come down all the centuries
and sit in spirit on the bench with the great chief justices of
this latter day, as counsel cite the arguments he once used
so skilfully. Markham, who was opposed to Fortescue, was
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still a serjeant, but he too was soon to be raised to a seat
on the King's Bench, where he was to "suffer for conscience
sake" and to earn the name of the "upright judge." Interesting men, all of them, and men of a mentality sufficient
to make either argument-br decision of theirs of value.
The case before them came up on a writ of trespass, and
it was "well debated" for they were all keen-witted men,
not over willing to yield a point. Paston and Fortescue
had the best of the argument, however, as well they might.
Paston warning Markham that he had not made his farrier
a "common farrier" and that unless lie (lid this his plea
would be of no avail, and Fortescue arguing that the assumption of the risk (most modern sounding of phrases)
was the cause of the action. Markham at last was driven
to "impari," so they probably agreed, when safely beyond
the sacred bounds of the court, on the precise points on
which to come to issue. Or else Markham's farrier, not
being a common farrier, did not care to face Paston's
decision, after his remarks from the Bench, and so Markham and his client vanish from the records of the court.
Not so the Principles for which Fortescue contended and
Paston decided. Today in nearly every well known case
of carriers the case of Coggs v. Bernardwill be cited either
by counsel or by the court, and in citing that case this Year
Book case of ours is referred to, as it was cited by counsel
and referred to by Lord Holt in that case. Lord Holt
might have been inspired to "stir these points." but
it is very doubtful if he could have convinced his contemporaries by the mere force of his inspiration without the
use of that authority which he collected from the Year
Books. From those books we step to the case of Coggs v.
Bernard; from that case into every ramification of the law
of bailments and of carriers. To be specific we can trace
our case of 19 Hen. VI, to Coggs v. Bernard; from that
case to that of Clark v. Bariz.uell, 12 How. (U. S.) 272,
(18pi), through this case to many later cases in the United
States Supreme. Court, and, by use of the same process,
through all the courts of all the States.
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Neither the modern cases which we trace back, or the
ancient case which we follow into the modern world, are
examples taken because of their adaptability for the purposes of the argument. They must serve because some
example must be taken, but almost any case, taken at randoin from the reports. will be found to lead to the same
result. It is not only easy to do it, it is impossible not
to do it, if a brief is to be made with any sort of accuracy
or depth of reasoning. The brief that cites so well known
a case as that of For-ward v. Pittard,may be written by a
man who has no knowledge of the Year Books. But he has
then put himself in the hands of an unknown power; lie
shows himself as dependent upon that case, and we have
shown that that case is dependent upon the cases in the
Year Books. If he knows only Forardv. Pittard, and
must argue the case upon arguments deduced from it, he
may find himself arguing against a man who not only
knows that case but is familiar with the various arguments
in the Year Books which led to the making of that decision.
Should the point to be argued be a delicate one, can there
be any doubt that the man who is familiar with the subtleties of those old- debaters; who knows how the points
were argued then; how they were settled and unsettled.
and finally got shaped into that which is now the accepted
law, will best be able to overrule the arguments, to distinguish the differences, to challenge the statements, which
may be made in the course of the litigation. Which will
win? The man with only a superficial knowledge, going
only half way back, or the man with a knowledge that is
thoroughly grounded in the sources of the law? But it will
be said that the chances are that neither will ever have gone
so far back, and thus one will be as well-weaponed as the
other. The man who fights chance fights odds few lawyers
have a right to take; and men have taken such chances and
failed. Have we not the well known Girard will case to
prove that the man who takes it for granted that he will
not have an opponent learned in the older law, has thrown.
away the chances of his client in a blind reliance upon the
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ignorance of that opponent? \t any time, in any case, the
same thing may happen. and it is increasingly more probable with every advance of knowledge. with every passing
year that brings new students into the field. Take the case
in Henry Sixth that we have been talking about. The
case that led back to it was a case in which the responsibility
of a common carrier was in question. The case in 9 Hen.
VI was a case of trespass, and had nothing apparently to
do with carriers, but had to do with the doctrine of the
assumption of risk and with the holding forth as a common
carrier. The principles.there stated were carried over into
the law of carriers, or rather, the principles in the case of
a public farrier and a public carrier were recognized to be
the same. A man unfamiliar with the Year Book cases,
and not having the line of cases in his mind might say, but
this is not a case of a carrier, and even if it were he was
a simple carter, and here in this case of the "Folnena" we
not only have a modern carrier, but we have the case of
a great ship, and there is no connection between the two
cases; the principles in the one cannot govern the other.
Put one who has studied the line of cases knows how and
when the case of the land carrier came to be assimilated
with that of the shipmaster. Sir Mathew Hale in Coggs
v. Bernard says, "this is the case of a conn1 rarrier. common hoyman. master of a ship, etc. Which case of a master
of a ship was first adjudged 26 Car. 2, in the case of Mors
v. Slezet." In that case of Mors v. Slev, as Hale spells it,
it was strongly argued that the case of a shipmaster was
not that of a common carrier, and "the Court inclined
strongly for the defendant, there being not the least negligence in him." and Ventris in his first.report. (Ventris, i9o)
would not have it that a verdict was given for the plantiff,
saving. "But since I've heard that it was compounded."But his later report of the case (p. 238) corrects that error,
and it *is correctly reported by Raymond (Sir T. Raymond.
220). While the law had nndoubtedly been drawing toward
that point ever since the first cases in which the carrier had
been held liable under the theory of his common employment,

4o6
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and his assumption of the duty to carry safely, yet in the
argument it was possible to say, apparently without fear of
contradiction, "there is no case of this nature in experience."
But Hale, who finally delivered the judgment, decided it
upon the assumption that the case of a master of a ship is the
same as that of a hoyman, and the hoyman had already
come into the class of common carriers, under the common
law (Hob. 17). The hoyman being supposed to receive his
payment directly from the patron, as the original carter or
carrier did, that step was easy; it was only when it came
to the master of a ship that it was argued by many, even by
Maynard himself, that the case was different, for the carrier was paid by the owner of the goods, "but here the
master is servant to the owner of the ship." But Ventris
in his second report of the case when it came up before
Hale, makes Hale answer this objection by saying, "The
law takes notice of him as more than a servant * * *
he is rather the officer than a servant." Thus Sir Mathew
Hale answered the argument of Mr. Hole, counsel in that
case, and so the law was established which today holds good
in the court of last resort in the United States.
Another case in the law of carriers is that of Inman v.
Seaboard Air Line Co., (59 Fed. 960) decided in 19o8. The
case rests for authority, among other cases, on Clark v.
Barinell, 12 How. (U. S.) 272 (I85O), which case cites
Forward v. Pittard, i T. R. 27 (1785), which leads us to
3 Hen. VI, 36, and to many other citations from the Year
Books.
If it is desired to trace a principle through the later cases
to the older ones in other sub-divisions of the law, we may
take a case in torts which supports the proposition that
"an action lies against a person who wilfully and with intent
to do harm, hinders another in the exercise of his lawful
right." We will take a case in Nebraska, Lowe v. Prospect
Hill Ceinetcry Association (58 Neb. 94, 1899), a recent case
in a sufficiently modern community. Counsel cite one hundred and twenty-five cases, thus shoving their belief that the
law is founded on precedent. Among the authorities thus
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cited is the Earl of Ripon v. Hobart, 3 Mylne & Keen, I69, in
which the judge (p. 181 ) cites for authority. Hale, in a note
to Fitzherbert's Natura Brevium (181, n. B.) which note
is founded on 13 Ed. Ill, a Year Book case.
In contract we may take the case of Rann v. Hughcs,
supporting the proposition that "a promise not under seal
does not form a ground for action unless supprted by a consideration." The case is given as a leading case in Volume
Six of the English Ruling Cases, and the first words of
a note to the case are "This rule has been established by
numerous cases from the Year Books downward." The
citations lead from the modern cases to Lcvinz (3 Lev.
403) to the Year Book of the first year of Hen. VII.
It may be said that these cases are cited to support fundamental, or elementary, principles of the law, and therefore
they necessarily lead back to the foundation or fundamental
cases. But to have taken cases upon some fine point, or insignificant branch of the law would have been to give point
to the objection thAt only in such cases would one ever beunder the necessity of reverting to such archaic instances.
It would have been quite as easy and perhaps even more
interesting to follow the finer point; the more slender thread,
but it would not have shown that the high road and the
beaten track still lead to the fountain head. But if there
has been given no case of a telegram or a flying machinethings it is granted were unknown to the leaders of the bar
in the days of Henry VI, yet the law of the telegraph is
founded upon the law of contract, and in regard to the
flying machine it may well be that we shall soon be appealing
to the principles of the ancient law of real property and its
doctrine of ownership in land giving rights to the uppermost
heights of the unfathomed spaces above us. Shall a man
who abhors racing be obliged to witness monoplanes racing
through his ether, while from pursuing biplanes drop the
phrases of the rack track and the betting pool? Can the
owner of lands, or can he not, enjoin the offending aviator
from keeping the sunshine from his melon patch, and the
balloonist from sanding his strawberries? In a case of
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first impression we do not go to the recent law reports..
Why should we seek what we already know to be a barren
field? We must first know what the Common Law said
long since, if not on the new subject, at least on subjects
in which a similar principle may be expected to have ruled.
And where do we go for that law? We go to the commentaries, the treatises, the digests and the abridgments.
And do not their references lead us most surely to the Year
Books?
The modern lawyer may not know a word of old
French; he may never have opened a Year Book; he
may not be able to trace a citation through the mazes
of an old abridgment; he may not care for the old
law, but may care only for "the practical side" of
the law, as he calls it, and the latest decision fresh
from the judicial pen. Not the less is he dependent
upon the older law. He can no more get away from it
than he can get away from past history, past development
in all the other surroundings and conditions of his life.
When he goes into court and talks about an assumpsit he
speaks as the men of old spoke. What is an action but
the thing they shaped? Where are the roots of those doctrines he-glibly or painfully as it may be-recites before
the court? Why does the court support or refuse his presentation of them? The court has to know if he does not,
or if-supposing the impossible-the court does not know,
it must borrow the knowledge somewhere. How could
Justice White decide as he did in the case of the "Folmena"
without Molloy and Bacon, and the case of the "Niagara"?
And whence did they get the wisdom to help him? How
could Hale make his decision in-Morse v. Sne without his
Year Books, and how could we get on without that case, and
the case of Coggs v. Bernard and Pittardv. Forward? The
weathercock on the vane may feel vastly superior to the
ancient stones beneath him, but there would be small glory
for him should the stones be moved from their foundations.
But we must not only go to the foundation, we must be
sure that our foundation is as broad as it should be, and
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that the stones are all in place. In the older abridgments,
in Statham and Fitzherbert, we find many citations to Year
Books which have never as yet been printed, which still
remain buried awaiting their resurrection through the printer's art. The cases in them are of the same authority as
those upon which we have for so long been founding our
law, and the older writers had access to them in their manuscript form. It seems a disgrace that there can still remain
unprinted, practically inaccessible, sources of the law so
valuable, so apparently priceless that it would seem that
they would have found their place in the world of learning
many and many a year ago. And more than this, the edition
of the Year Booki from which most of us have to obtain
what knowledge We have of them, is an edition which has.
never been collated and corrected by comparison with the
manuscripts which are so abundant, and which would afford a means by which we could complete, correct, and
clarify these old editions of ours; these most important,
most fundamental portions of our case law.
The thoughtful lawyer, the skilful practitioner, the student of the law, all need, and should demand, that in this
latter day, this day of discovery and enterprise and initiative in all other things, they should have set before them not
only a new edition of the already printed Year Books, but
that all the unprinted Year Books should be given to them,
in some such form as that in which Mr. Maitland gave to the
world his translation of that portion of the Maynard, or
oldest of the Year Books, which he was able to complete
before his death. Or if not in so ideal a manner, yet in
some correct and complete form, they should be given to
the world; the world which never at any time has too much
knowledge, and which cannot afford to forego the benefit
which would come to it from such a source.
It is not because the letter of the law stands written out
in these old books that they alone are valuable. Not too
much stress must be placed on authority. The dead hand
of the past must not be laid too heavily upon the quick brain
of the living present to chill it into inactivity. But the vivid
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life of today must send its roots down into the depths of
the past to draw thence the strength and the vigor which
shall give it, not the frail and freakish beauty of the air
plant, but the splendid strength of the oak and the magnificent virility of the poplar, which towers above its fellows
of the forest, stronger, straighter than them -all, yet bearing
upon its branches the most delicate, the most exquisite of
flowers. So should the modern tree of legal learning be. A
giant with roots grasping firmly the good earth from which
it grows, with branches gaining from every source of sun
and air a liberal life, and in their midst the flowering of
that pleasant wisdom which while it is the chief adornment
of the tree, is also the seed vessel from which shall spring
the yet grander tree of future times.
M. C. Klingelstsith.

